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Abstract In a prevailing employment contract the agent receives a
proportional split of commissions. Alternatively, the agent
receives a contract paying 100% of revenue above a ﬁxed
payment to the ﬁrm. In this contract the ﬁrm has a prior payment
position, similar to a landlord or lender. The coexistence of these
equity-only and debt-equity type contracts allows testing
incentives for productivity and effort for real estate licensees in
the United States. Hourly wages and productivity are increasing
in the agent’s split, up to and including 100%. Effort as measured
by hours worked are positively affected by the split. The contract
incentives motivate productivity and induce effort without
requiring monitoring.
In a traditional real estate employment contract, agents split the gross commissions
earned proportionally with the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm is effectively an equity joint
venture partner with the agent. The agent and ﬁrm receive compensation
contemporaneously. The agent’s split has conventionally been viewed as 50%, but
it is negotiable. The result is a range of splits that allow the agent to respond to
incentives.
Another employment contract has emerged in real estate. Instead of proportional
sharing, the ﬁrm charges a ﬁxed desk fee analogous to rent or a debt payment.
That payment is no longer contemporaneous but prior to compensation received
by the agent. The agent is left with a residual position, retaining any overage. In
this 100% equity contract the agent is similar to a retail tenant after paying a ﬁxed
but no percentage rent to the landlord. The agent is similar to the landlord making
a debt payment to the lender. The payment sequence is consecutive instead of
contemporaneous. RE/MAX and Keller Williams are among ﬁrms that offer 100%
equity contracts.
This paper examines how the agent responds to contract incentives with a range
of splits including receiving 100% of the commission after a ﬁxed fee. The
contract is determined by agreement prior to the agent’s production. The ﬁrm or
principal has the problem of monitoring effort and productivity, satisﬁed by
providing appropriate incentives.
The model divides total revenue generated into the portion allocated to the ﬁrm
and the agent. The agent’s earnings are the product of the average hourly wage398  Chinloy and Winkler
and hours worked. This division allows separate incentive effects to be determined
for productivity in the hourly wage and effort in hours worked.
Estimation is for 1,750 real estate licensees in 2004 in the United States, using a
sample from the National Association of Realtors (NAR). As compared with a
benchmark 50:50 partnership, higher splits to the agent result in increased hourly
wages and productivity. Each successive increment in agent compensation results
in higher average productivity. Effort or hours worked differ between the 100%
contract and the base 50:50 contract. In addition, hours worked are successively
increasing, but these are not statistically different among the contract groups above
the 50:50 contract except for agents on the 100% contract. Percentage increases
in productivity translate into similar total earnings gains for the agents. The results
are controlled for location, market, education and experience, and demographic
characteristics including race, gender, and ethnicity.
At some point the ﬁrm is unwilling to surrender its return to star agents, and that
provides the underlying rationale for the 100% contract. The 100% contract allows
the ﬁrm as principal to change the negotiations to put a ﬂoor on its return to cover
its ﬁxed costs. The agent beneﬁts from being able to bargain over the incremental
return. The 100% contract prevents ﬁrms from becoming negligible equity partners
while retaining incentives for agents to work harder and produce.
The next section provides some background on contracts for real estate agents.
Next, the model is introduced, along with its speciﬁcations. In the model, the
agent negotiates a split with the ﬁrm on commissions generated. The unique risk
of the 100% contract compared to other split contracts suggests a potential sample
selection problem that should be addressed. Therefore, a probit model is estimated
in the ﬁrst step. Conditional on the contract the agent responds with average
productivity as the hourly wage and with hours worked. The data are discussed
next, followed by an interpretation of the empirical results. The paper closes with
concluding remarks.
 Background
The contract between a real estate agent and a broker has elements of
sharecropping, equity sharing, and venture capital. The contract has evolved to
allow agents to retain 100% of commissions above a ﬁxed amount, analogous to
a debt-equity or landlord-tenant sequential payoff structure. The spectrum includes
proportional payments that make the agent and principal equity partners when the
split is less than 100%. The principal or broker observes the agent’s track record,
allowing the split to be negotiated. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) examine this
track record. They indicate the contract structure, which includes sequential
payment rights.
Rationales have been presented for why some agents accept 100% contracts and
become self-employed entrepreneurs. Self-employment reduces agency problems
associated with creating optimal incentives. Lazear (2004) hypothesizes thatContract Incentives and Effort  399
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entrepreneurs are generalists who do not excel in any one skill but are competent
in many. In Lazear (1981) and Lazear and Moore (1984), self-employed workers
have ﬂatter and more variable wage rates with experience. As conﬁrmation, Evans
and Leighton (1989) ﬁnd that the return to a year of experience for self-
employment is 2.1% versus 5.6% in wage work. That effort has been examined
in the real estate market by Benjamin, Jud, and Sirmans (2000) for hours worked
of licensees. McGreal and Webb (2010) consider listings and sales time in the
United Kingdom.
Regarding the split, Holmstro ¨m (1979) models sharing rules in the principal-agent
relationship given various states of observable information. A proportional sharing
rule is optimal for speciﬁc utility functions. Baker (1992) develops a linear
incentive contract system in a compensation contract. These incentives are testable
for real estate agents. They have contracts with explicit incentives through the
split, and output is observable and measurable.
Real estate research has investigated how incentive contracts are related to agent
hours worked, earnings, and selling price. Miceli (1991) examines the inﬂuence
of splits on broker hours worked. Splitting creates an incentive for brokers to
acquire and share listings. Sirmans and Turnbull (1997) ﬁnd that the commission
rate responds to changes in the housing market and agent costs.
Williams (1998) ﬁnds a proportional rate is optimal by reducing dissipative
actions. Bruce and Santore (2006) argue that above-normal commission rates are
consistent with competition, and that a lower rate may lead to reduced hours
worked.
Benjamin, Chinloy, Jud, and Winkler (2007) examine the work incentive
differentials of a contract. Miceli, Pancak, and Sirmans (2007) show that while
the ownership of a listing may be privately valuable, it is not competitively
efﬁcient. Technology acts to leverage human capital, permitting agents to extend
their market size and enhancing communication with sales prospects.
Munneke and Yavas (2001) develop a model based on the agent maximizing
commission proﬁts. The most productive agents self-select into a 100% equity
contract and there is an inducement to work harder. Agents on a 100% equity
contract pay a ﬁxed desk fee, and expend more effort on acquiring listings. The
marginal effort per listing decreases with the number of listings acquired.
Empirical tests examine whether 100% agents obtain higher house prices or
reduced time-on-the-market. Freedom of entry dissipates any performance
differentials in the house price and selling time.
 The Model
The agent has skills such as education and experience. Some of these skills are
speciﬁc to the industry, including years of experience licensed and whether
specializing in listing or selling. Others are speciﬁc to the ﬁrm, including years400  Chinloy and Winkler
working there. These skills and characteristics of the agent are X. The agent and
ﬁrm negotiate a contract prior to actual performance. The contract offers the agent
a split of s(X), 0  s(X)  1. That contract includes the possibility of the agent
receiving 100% of the income generated above a threshold. In this case the agent
pays a ﬁxed fee to the ﬁrm
The choice of contract split depends on the agent’s preferences. Total time
available to the agent is , bounded by 24 hours in a day. The number of hours
worked are h. The agent’s utility is u(  h, s, X). Hours worked h reduce utility
and the contract split s allows more consumption. Utility depends on the
characteristics X. Agents may have preferences for being their own boss. Those
preferences are u1(  h1,1:X1) for threshold levels of hours worked h1, split
s  1, and characteristics X1. A preference for being one’s own boss means that
utility is at least this threshold level, with u(  h, s, X)  u1(  h1,1:X1).
This condition leads to a distribution of agents over contracts and the decision
rule:
0  s  1 u(  h, s, X)  u1 s  (1) 1 u(  h, s, X)  u1
Equation (1) describes the selection of the contract. Those with preferences to be
their own boss view the ﬁrm as a debt provider or landlord and s  1. Agents
willing to split earnings with the ﬁrm have contracts with splits s  1.
The production or gross earnings of the agent are ƒ(h, s : X) depending on the
hours worked h, split s, and characteristics X, such as education, experience, and
specialization. The production function ƒ is increasing and concave in the hours
and split h, s. The net earnings of the agent are sƒ(h, s : X). The ﬁrm’s return for
a split s  1 is production less the agent’s share or ƒ(h, s : X)  sƒ(h, s : X).
When the agent chooses the 100% equity contract, the ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed desk fee
 as rent.
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is maximized subject to the agent’s utility and preferences as a
constraint. This maximization is on (1  s)ƒ subject to the incentive compatibility
constraint on utility at limit u* and the self-selection on the split (1). The
maximization problem is:
max (1  s)ƒ(  h, s : X) (2)
s,h
ST u(  h, s : X)  u* s  1
u  u* s  1Contract Incentives and Effort  401
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The maximization problem is (1  s)ƒ(s, h)  1(u(s,   h)  u*)  2(1  s)
for a given skill set X. Prices of the incentive compatibility and self-selection
constraints are 1, 2. Maximizing ﬁrm proﬁts with respect to the split and hours
leads to the ﬁrst-order condition, where lower-case letter subscripts indicate partial
derivatives:
s :( 1 s*)ƒ  ƒ   u   s*  0 s 1 s 2 (3) h : (1  s*)ƒ   u  0 h 1 h
From the optimal split and hours, the hourly wage satisﬁes:
s*(h*, X)ƒ(h*, s*:X)
w*(s*, X)  . (4)
h*
The wage is conditional on the self-selection for those taking an equity contract.
The agent’s ability to generate sales and revenue is in the production function ƒ.
The optimal split and hours are obtained from the optimization as s*, h*. These
determine the hourly wage as w*.
 Specification
The agent negotiates a contract choice indexed by I. A 100% contract agent
receives all earnings above a ﬁxed desk fee or rent, and is denoted by I  1, s 
1. An agent under a split commission contact has I  0, 0  s  1. The agent
prefers a 100% contract over splitting with the ﬁrm for given characteristics X
when:
I*  u(s  1)  u(s  1)  0. (5)
A linear speciﬁcation is I*  X   with parameters  and E(I*)  X.A
disturbance term  has zero mean with E()  0. The assignment is:
I*  X  
I  1 s  1 X    0 (6) I  0 s  1 X    0402  Chinloy and Winkler
An agent with the 100% contract has s  1. Skills including experience, education,
and specialization are observed in X. The conditional assignment of the agent is
an adverse selection, where those with fewer skills are assigned smaller splits.
The self-selection variable is m.
The wage and hours equations are estimated concurrently as:
w  X 	   s  
 m   ww w m . (7) h  X    s  
 m   hw h m
The selection parameter on whether a person wants to accept the 100% contract
is 
. The split is s with parameters . If the split induces greater productivity or
effort,   0.
 Data and Empirical Results
The data for this study are from the National Association of Realtors Member
Survey. The sample includes 8,450 agents surveyed in June 2005 for the 2004
calendar year. The data distinguish wage and hours worked by contract conditions
including split. The survey provides information on beginning and end of year
agent split, total compensation, hours worked, and skill and demographic
variables.
To focus the study, personnel other than sales agents are excluded. Additional
constraints are that agents must earn at least 50% of their real estate income from
residential sales and receive at least a 50% commission split. Those agents who
received less than a 50% commission comprise 4.6% of the all agents in the NAR
survey of residential agents. These agents could be in training or have a ﬁxed
salary in addition to a commission. Because there is reason to believe that these
agents are atypical compared to other agents on commission, they were excluded
from the ﬁnal sample.
With these restrictions and for those answering on hours, split, compensation
income to determine tax rates there are 3,099 applicable observations. The
additional restriction of the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is concurrent,
non-missing observations in both the wage and hours equations results in 1,750
observations for the regression analysis. Those employed as full time are deﬁned
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics measure of working at least 20 hours per
week.
Respondents indicate the local market where they operate. To adjust for these
local market conditions, metro employment and unemployment data are obtained
from the BLS. To control for regional variation in house prices, the median in the
local market for the fourth quarter of 2004 is used from the National Association
of Realtors.Contract Incentives and Effort  403
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Sample statistics on the contract, showing the variation in the agent shares are in
Exhibit 1. The pooled sample columns are for the entire sample, reﬂecting
promotions and demotions. The split agent unchanged columns shows the
descriptive statistics for agents who kept the same split for the entire calendar
year. The contract terms at the beginning of the year are known before returns are
observed.
The conventional notion that the agent and ﬁrm split the revenue 50:50 is not
necessarily the case. While 27% are on a 50:50 split, 73% of agents have contract
splits more than 50%. Of all agents, 13% are on 100% contracts paying the ﬁrm
a ﬁxed rental or desk fee.
Exhibit 1 has sample statistics for non-contract variables. The average agent works
42.2 hours a week with annualized hourly earnings of $1,542, and has earnings
of about $65,000 per year. Based on a 50-week work year, the average hourly
wage is $30.83. The average full-time agent has 14.7 years of schooling and 10.7
years of experience.
Empirical ﬁndings for the probit model are N in Exhibit 2. The dependent variable
is whether or not the agent holds a 100% contract at the beginning of the calendar
year. Column section 1 shows the ﬁndings of all agents, while column section 2
focuses on agents who did not have a change in their commission split during the
year. The ﬁndings indicate that experience increases the likelihood that an agent
will have a 100% contract. Likewise, agents who have a personal webpage for
business or own other residential properties are more likely to have a 100%
contract. Agents who are married, female, describe themselves as ﬁrm employees,
or work for larger ﬁrms are less likely to have 100% contracts.
Results for wages of agents are shown in Exhibit 3. The table distinguishes
between all agents and those who kept the same percentage payout of their
contract for the entire calendar year. An interactive variable for experience and
the 100% contract is included, and the coefﬁcient is negative. At higher levels of
experience, the 100% contract recipient eventually has a wage below that at the
91%–99% level. This result is consistent with the loss of comparative advantage
in entrepreneurial activity in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenson (2002).
The contract split is divided into split categories. The reference group is those
receiving a 50% split. The groups are in deciles beginning at 51%, 61%, 71%,
81%, and 91% with a separate category for 100% contracts. The base group is
agents on a 50:50 split.
Agents receiving 51%–60% are more productive than those in the reference
category of 50%. Once the agent receives more than 60% of the revenue, wages
rise sharply, and continue to increase successively throughout the split contracts.
For a 100% contract, the wage increase reﬂects a prominent jump compared to
split contracts. The hourly wage is net of all business expenses, and therefore,
reﬂects the ﬁxed costs obligations incurred by agents with 100% contracts. The
coefﬁcients appear uniformly larger for agents who did not incur a split change





















Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics of Non-Commission Share Variable
Pooled
Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Agent Split Unchanged
Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Beginning of Year Commission 67.966 17.383 3,099 70.927 18.374 2,181
End of Year Commission 71.882 18.412 3,099 70.927 18.374 2,181
50% Commission Split 0.271 0.445 3,099 0.2423 0.429 2,181
51%–60% Commission Split 0.187 0.390 3,099 0.159 0.365 2,181
61%–70% Commission Split 0.213 0.410 3,099 0.194 0.395 2,181
71%–80% Commission Split 0.134 0.340 3,099 0.146 0.354 2,181
81%–90% Commission Split 0.038 0.192 3,099 0.045 0.207 2,181
91%–99% Commission Split 0.028 0.166 3,099 0.037 0.189 2,181
100% (No Commission Split) 0.126 0.331 3,099 0.174 0.379 2,181
Net Hourly Wages (Annualized) ($) 1,541.510 2,733.770 3,099 1,511.670 2,953.650 2,181
Ln(Net Wages Annualized) 7.105 0.922 3,099 7.043 0.960 2,181
Ln(Net After Tax Wages) 6.257 1.108 2,996 6.181 1.157 2,113
Hours Worked Weekly 42.154 15.478 3,099 41.061 15.821 2,181
Ln(Weekly Hours) 3.645 0.505 3,099 3.607 0.537 2,181
Own Listings/Other Agents Listings Sold 0.584 1.111 2,937 0.583 1.119 2,076
Personal Webpage for Business 0.486 0.500 3,099 0.448 0.497 2,181
Employee of Firm 0.016 0.125 3,099 0.017 0.129 2,181
Number Vacation Homes Owned 0.182 0.484 3,094 0.181 0.483 2,177




















































Exhibit 1  (continued)
Descriptive Statistics of Non-Commission Share Variable
Pooled
Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Agent Split Unchanged
Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Years of Schooling 14.709 1.968 3,096 14.675 1.962 2,179
Years of Experience 10.672 9.875 3,078 10.998 9.933 2,164
Years of Experience Squared 211.382 326.210 3,078 219.568 326.316 2,164
Years of Experience with Firm 5.946 6.277 3,001 6.049 6.383 2,115
Married 0.727 0.445 3,099 0.722 0.448 2,181
Real Estate Not First Career 0.957 0.202 3,099 0.960 0.197 2,181
Broker 0.178 0.383 3,099 0.189 0.392 2,181
Owner 0.004 0.062 3,099 0.005 0.068 2,181
Female 0.561 0.496 3,099 0.549 0.498 2,181
African-American 0.040 0.196 3,099 0.038 0.190 2,181
Asian 0.020 0.140 3,099 0.019 0.136 2,181
Native 0.008 0.088 3,099 0.008 0.091 2,181
Hispanic 0.031 0.172 3,099 0.034 0.180 2,181
Ln(Firm Size, Number of Employees) 4.104 1.917 3,099 3.925 1.941 2,181
Employment Growth, Area, 2004 % 1.257 1.274 2,317 1.278 1.278 1,659
Employment, Area, 12/04, millions 1.097 1.026 2,317 1.076 1.000 1,659
Median Housing Price in MSA ($1,000) 195.573 81.877 2,020 194.082 82.224 1,439
Ln(Median Housing Price) 5.206 0.360 2,020 5.198 0.359 1,439
Full Time 0.885 0.319 3,099 0.865 0.342 2,181406  Chinloy and Winkler
Exhibit 2  Agent Splits: Probit Estimates
(1) (2)
Pooled Sample Agent Split Unchanged
Variable Coeff. SE P-value Coeff. SE P-value
Constant 1.6244 0.2717 0.0001 1.7885 0.3000 0.0001
Own Listings/Other Agents
Listings Sold
0.0462 0.0303 0.1271 0.0436 0.0326 0.1810
Years of Schooling 0.0092 0.0161 0.5671 0.0216 0.0178 0.2241
Years of Experience 0.0971 0.0112 0.0001 0.0985 0.0122 0.0001
Years of Experience Squared 0.0021 0.0003 0.0001 0.0021 0.0004 0.0001
Married 0.1281 0.0702 0.0682 0.1143 0.0770 0.1375
Female 0.1589 0.0642 0.0133 0.1672 0.0705 0.0177
Personal Webpage for Business 0.4376 0.0655 0.0001 0.5729 0.0716 0.0001
Employee of Firm 0.4217 0.3157 0.1816 0.4600 0.3361 0.1710
No. of Other Resid. Prop. Owned 0.0281 0.0079 0.0004 0.0348 0.0093 0.0002
Ln(Firm Size) 0.0985 0.0166 0.0001 0.0785 0.0182 0.0001
Notes: The dependent variable  1 if agent has a 100% contract and zero otherwise. Column
section (1) shows the entire (entire) sample of agents and brokers. Column section (2) shows those
agents and brokers that retained the same split during the year. Own Listings/Other Agents
Listings Sold is the ratio of listings sold from the agents own listings divided by the number of
listings sold by the agent that are from listings of other agents. Years of schooling based on
highest level of education completed. Years of experience based on years active as a real estate
professional. Married  1 if the agent is married. Female  1 if the agent is female. Personal
Webpage for Business  1 if the agent has own web page for real estate business purposes.
Employee  1 if the agent is afﬁliated with the real estate ﬁrm as an employee. No. of Other
Resid. Prop. Owned is the number of residential properties owned for investment purposes
(excludes primary residence and vacation homes). Logarithm of ﬁrm size is in number of
employees. For the Pooled Sample, N  2,898 and Log-Likelihood  984.23; for Agent Split
Unchanged, N  2,048 and Log-Likelihood  833.95.
While 100% contracts result in high wages compared to others, they reﬂect the
wages of a comparatively small percentage of high performing agents who are
willing to accept the risk of self employment, and who are capable of achieving
high levels of productivity. Moreover, the contract coefﬁcients appear consistently
larger for agents whose split remains unchanged during the calendar year,
suggesting that stability of the contract is accompanied by higher wages.
In addition to the contract, skill measures inﬂuence wages. An additional year of
general real estate experience and speciﬁc ﬁrm experience raises wages by 2.6%
and 2.2%, respectively. The experience effect is concave, increasing at aContract Incentives and Effort  407
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Exhibit 3  3SLS SUR Regressions of Hourly Wages: Skills and Contract Incentives
(1) (2)
Pooled Sample Agent Split Unchanged
Variable Coeff. SE P-value Coeff. SE P-value
Constant 3.9210 0.4158 0.0001 4.0215 0.4808 0.0001
Agent Share
51%–60% 0.5775 0.1694 0.0007 0.6166 0.2034 0.0024
61%–70% 0.9703 0.1899 0.0001 1.1282 0.2250 0.0001
71%–80% 1.2789 0.2061 0.0001 1.5460 0.2394 0.0001
81%–90% 1.4611 0.2332 0.0001 1.7797 0.2670 0.0001
91%–99% 1.5521 0.2255 0.0001 1.8470 0.2589 0.0001
100% (ﬁtted value from probit) 2.2775 0.4542 0.0001 2.3897 0.4313 0.0001
Skills
Years of Schooling 0.0228 0.0102 0.0254 0.0252 0.0118 0.0334
Years of Experience 0.0264 0.0159 0.0971 0.0274 0.0171 0.1080
Years of Experience Squared 0.0007 0.0004 0.0581 0.0008 0.0004 0.0326
Years of Experience with Firm 0.0219 0.0049 0.0001 0.0230 0.0056 0.0001
Full Time 0.4013 0.0663 0.0001 0.4580 0.0730 0.0001
Second Career 0.3073 0.0966 0.0015 0.2465 0.1134 0.0297
Broker 0.1389 0.0652 0.0330 0.1057 0.0712 0.1376
Owner 0.4950 0.3809 0.1937 0.4799 0.4153 0.2479
Own Listings/Other Agents
Listings Sold
0.0472 0.0194 0.0150 0.0425 0.0222 0.0554
Macro and Controls
Ln(Firm Size) 0.0744 0.0139 0.0001 0.0623 0.0140 0.0001
Employment Growth in Metro. 0.0274 0.0246 0.2668 0.0241 0.0262 0.3578
Dec. 2004 Employment in Metro. 0.0755 0.0262 0.0040 0.0708 0.0303 0.0197
Ln(Median Housing Price) 0.3783 0.0666 0.0001 0.3016 0.0775 0.0001
Notes: The wages regression and hourly wages regression are estimated as seemingly unrelated
equations. The dependent variable is the employee’s wage, the logarithm of the before-tax
annualized hourly net wage; wages are net of business expenses. Independent variables: Contract
incentives: share of total production retained by employee from 50% through 100%; the 50%
commission group is the base. The 100% contract variable is formed from the ﬁtted probabilities
from the probit equation. Skills: Years of schooling based on highest level of education completed.
Years of experience based on years active as a real estate professional. Full Time  1 if agents
working more than 20 hours per week. Second Career  1 if employee had another job
previously outside of real estate. Broker  1 if holding this license designation. Owner  1i f
owns ﬁrm. Macro and Controls: Logarithm of ﬁrm size in number of employees. Employment
growth rate in the MSA is for December 2003–December 2004. December 2004 MSA
employment is in millions. Estimates include controls for marital status, gender and race-ethnicity
variables for African-American, White, Asian, Hispanic and Native-American. For the Pooled
Sample, N  1,750 and Log-Likelihood  2,138.09; for Agent Split Unchanged, N  1,259
and Log-Likelihood  1,506.68.408  Chinloy and Winkler
Exhibit 4  3SLS SUR Regressions of Hours Worked: Skills and Contract Incentives
(1) (2)
Pooled Sample Agent Split Unchanged
Variable Coeff. SE P-value Coeff. SE P-value
Constant 2.5223 0.1580 0.0001 2.4136 0.1903 0.0001
Agent Share
51%–60% 0.1552 0.0644 0.0159 0.1978 0.0805 0.0140
61%–70% 0.1588 0.0722 0.0278 0.2195 0.0890 0.0137
71%–80% 0.1974 0.0783 0.0117 0.2578 0.0947 0.0065
81%–90% 0.2261 0.0886 0.0107 0.2972 0.1057 0.0049
91%–99% 0.2379 0.0857 0.0055 0.3473 0.1024 0.0007
100% (ﬁtted value from probit) 0.4010 0.1726 0.0202 0.4661 0.1707 0.0063
Skills
Years of Schooling 0.0028 0.0039 0.4717 0.0021 0.0047 0.6467
Years of Experience 0.0084 0.0060 0.1659 0.0120 0.0068 0.0749
Years of Experience Squared 0.0002 0.0001 0.2552 0.0002 0.0002 0.1359
Years of Experience with Firm 0.0003 0.0019 0.8545 0.0011 0.0022 0.6041
Full Time 1.1292 0.0252 0.0001 1.1105 0.0289 0.0001
Second Career 0.0129 0.0367 0.7255 0.0096 0.0449 0.8314
Broker 0.0099 0.0248 0.6894 0.0117 0.0282 0.6784
Owner 0.0857 0.1447 0.5539 0.2293 0.1643 0.1630
Own Listings/Other Agents
Listings Sold
0.0139 0.0074 0.0602 0.0139 0.0088 0.1140
Macro and Controls
Ln(Firm Size) 0.0248 0.0053 0.0001 0.0215 0.0056 0.0001
Employment Growth in Metro. 0.0020 0.0094 0.8300 0.0083 0.0104 0.4221
Dec. 2004 Employment in Metro. 0.0040 0.0100 0.6841 0.0127 0.0120 0.2898
Ln(Median Housing Price) 0.0080 0.0253 0.7527 0.0103 0.0307 0.7368
Notes: The wages regression and hourly wages regression are estimated as seemingly unrelated
equations. The dependent variable is agent hours worked, the logarithm of hours worked per
week. Independent variables: Contract incentives: share of total production retained by employee
from 50% through 100%; the 50% commission group is the base. The 100% contract variable is
formed from the ﬁtted probabilities from the probit equation. Skills: Years of schooling based on
highest level of education completed. Years of experience based on years active as a real estate
professional. Full Time  Agents working more than 20 hours per week. Second Career  1i f
employee had another job previously outside of real estate. Broker  1 if holding this license
designation. Owner  1 if owns ﬁrm. Macro and Controls: Logarithm of ﬁrm size in number of
employees. Employment growth rate in the MSA is for December 2003–December 2004.
December 2004 MSA employment is in millions. The logarithmic before-tax ﬁtted wage (wage)
variable from Table 3 is used to calculate the after-tax rate. Estimates include controls for marital
status, gender and race-ethnicity variables for African-American, White, Asian, Hispanic and
Native-American. For the Pooled Sample, N  1,750 and Log-Likelihood  444.74; for Agent
Split Unchanged, N  1,259 and Log-Likelihood  339.56.Contract Incentives and Effort  409
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Exhibit 5  Contract Coefﬁcient Equality Tests for Wages and Hours Worked
(1) (2)










51%  60%  61%  70% 0.39 0.52 0.00 0.02
31.62 35.72 0.02 0.41
(0.01) (0.01) (0.90) (0.53)
61%  70%  71%  80% 0.31 0.42 0.04 0.04
19.77 27.81 2.14 1.49
(0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.23)
71%  80%  81%  90% 0.18 0.23 0.03 0.04
2.67 3.70 0.46 0.67
(0.11) (0.06) (0.50) (0.42)
81%  90%  91%  99% 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.05
0.38 0.19 0.04 0.66
(0.54) (0.67) (0.84) (0.42)
51%  60%  100% 1.70 1.77 0.25 0.27
31.87 49.66 4.61 7.26
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
61%  70%  100% 1.31 1.26 0.24 0.25
22.23 31.52 5.29 7.69
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
71%  80%  100% 1.00 0.84 0.20 0.21
14.19 15.65 4.09 6.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
81%  90%  100% 0.82 0.61 0.17 0.17
9.42 7.68 2.99 3.76
(0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.06)
91%  99%  100% 0.73 0.54 0.16 0.12
6.51 5.37 2.28 1.64
(0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.20)
51%  60%  61%  70%  —— — —
71%  80%  81%  90%  107.64 141.77 8.09 12.92
91%  99%  100% (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.03)
Notes: The absolute difference in the agent share category coefﬁcients from Exhibits 3 and 4 is
reported on the top line. The statistical signiﬁcance is measured by the Wald statistic that is
reported on the second line. The statistical signiﬁcance level of the Wald statistics is shown in
parentheses on the third line.410  Chinloy and Winkler
decreasing rate. Agents who sell more of their own listings earn higher wages.
Agents who had a previous career outside of real estate earn 26% less. Larger
ﬁrms have scale and scope advantages that increase the wage. A 1% increase in
the median housing price raises wage by 0.38%. Higher hourly wages are earned
in more expensive housing markets.
The impact of contract terms on hours worked is shown in Exhibit 4 for all agents
and those who kept the same payout for the calendar year. All contract coefﬁcients
are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and hours worked increase
with the agent’s split. Most notably, 100% contract agents work more hours than
those on split contracts. Comparing all agents in the sample with agents whose
split is unchanged during the calendar year, hours worked is higher across all split
deciles.
With the exception of agents who are categorized as full time by virtue of working
at least 20 hours, none of the other skill coefﬁcients is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. Agents at larger ﬁrms work more hours. Contracts appear to provide
motivation for agents to work more hours.
A remaining test is for equality of the contract coefﬁcients for wages and hours
worked. The joint test in Exhibit 5 indicates that the coefﬁcients for wages are
statistically different from each other. Split interval tests are shown with the
associated levels of statistical signiﬁcance. Wages of agents in contract deciles of
51%–80% are signiﬁcantly higher than wages of agents on 50:50 splits; these
differences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In addition, 100% contracts
result in higher wages than all other contacts. These differences are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The joint tests of coefﬁcients on hours worked indicates that for agents as a whole,
contract splits do not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on hours worked.
Agents working on 51%–80% split contracts whose splits are unchanged during
the year and work fewer hours than those on a 100% contract.
 Conclusion
Technology that facilitates communication and contacts has enabled agents to
make a choice between incentive and focus. This has led to a dispersion of
contracts by agent split. Higher splits motivate agents to increase wages and
average productivity. This wage is particularly pronounced once an agent has more
than a 60% split. Agents on a 100% contract have signiﬁcantly higher wages and
agents receiving a split, even after subtracting expenses. This is consistent with
their holding additional risk.
Hours worked increase with the contract split, and 100% contract agents work
more hours than agents on a split contract. For agents that keep the same split
arrangement, the hours worked are higher across all categories including 100%Contract Incentives and Effort  411
JRER  Vol. 32  N o . 4–2 0 1 0
contracts. Other variables are largely unimportant in explaining hours worked,
suggesting that real estate ﬁrms should view contracts as the most important
motivator for enticing agents to work harder.
Munneke and Yavas (2001) suggest that 100% contracts lead to an adverse
selection. More productive agents are attracted to the entrepreneurial nonlinear
contract. The adverse selection here goes further. Contracts that pay agents 51%–
99% splits lead to focus and a higher wage when compared to 50:50 split
contracts.
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